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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KLAUS

\

D. GURGEL,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
D. WAYNE

ICase No
10793

NICHOL,

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S

BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This action was commenced by the Plaintiff on July 5,
1!:JG(i. in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County against
the Defendant for conversion and trespass.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant was the owner of a certain residential
property located at 2!)12 East 4800 South. Salt Lake County
State of Utah, which was mortgaged to the

Trac~·

Collin,

Savings and Trust Company. On the 7th day of De<'ember.
1964,

Tracy

Collins

Saving,;

and

Trust

Company loo~

judgment against the Defendant in the Third District Court
for Salt Lake County, Civil No. 14979:2 and on the :26th da.1
of January, 196!), said propC'rty was sold at Sheriff's Sale to
one D. L. Holt (record page l 9). On the 7th day of Augu~t.
1965. the Defendant vacated the premi;.;es (re<'orded page 11.
Answer No. 6) and on the :2:)th day of April, 1966, D.L. Holt
and his wife and the Plaintiff and his wife entered rnlo a

Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale- and purchase or
the aforedescribed property (n'cord pages l:J & 16). Plaintiff took posse::;sion of the property on that date. On the bth
day of May, 1966, the Defendant, without permission of lhe
Plaintiff and without prior demand entered the premises

of

the Plaintiff while he and hi::; famil.v wNe away and removed
the items described in Paragraph :2 of Plaintiff's Complaint
(record page 11. Answt>r 8 & 9).
After demanding the return of the property removed by
the Defendant from the premise::; and Defendant's failure• to
do so, this action was commenced.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment upon
the grounds that the pleadings, Answers to Interrogatorie,:.
Affidavit, and Exhibits show that Defendant had transferrt>d
all right, title, and interest in the property in que:-;tion at lhe
Sheriff's Sale or abandoned :-;ame>, and that the Plaintiff had
acquired the right to the immediatP and :-;olP po:-;:-;es:-;ion ol

~aid

prorwrty on the 2Gth day of April, 1966, and therefore

tlwrP was no genuine i::isue as to any material fact between
the parti<:>." and Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment against
tht> Defendant for the value of the property converted by the
Drfendant and such puniti\·e damages as may be reasonable

, I

and judgment dismissing Defendant's counterelaim (records
pages 17 & 18). Said Motion was granted and the Plaintiff
awarded judgment again:;;t the Defendant for $1500.00 and
$1.00 punitive damages and dismissing Defendant's counterclaim (record pages 21 & 22).

ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANT EITHER TRANSFERRED ALL
INTEREST HE HAD IN THE PROPERTY OR ABANDONED
IT AND THE PLAINTIFF HAD ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO
ITS POSSESSION WHEN REMO\'ED BY THE DEFENDANT
O'.'l ~IAY 8, 1966.
The
di\!ng
'i\\

in\'Ol\'ed in this dispute consists of fi\'e

propert~·

boards, Lhree swimming pool

imming

pool

ladder,

one

heating units, one

swimming

pool

heater, one

"wimming pool lighting fixture, and one work table. The
property

conve~·<:>d

by the Sheriff's Deed on January 26, 1965,

consists of the real property, a residenl'e, a garage, a bathhou.-;e,
I

I

and a swimming pool. The aforementioned items,

rxcept for the work table, e\'en though not attached to the
s11imming pool itself on May 8, 1966, the date of Defendant's
con\'ersion, could ha\·e been so attached and used by the
Plaintiff in conrwction with the u:se of the swimming pool
un the premises.

3

The

last paragraph of the

Sheriff's

Deed aft0r lhc·

legal description of the property states:
"Togeth0r with all and singular the tenements, hPrcditaments, an appurtenances thereunto belonging or
in anywise appertaining, to ha\e and to hold the samp
unto said party of the second part, its successor.sand
assigns forever."
Black's Law Dictionary. Fourth Edition, 19:)7, at PagP
16:37 defines "tenement" as follows:
"Thi:-; term. in its vulgar acceptation, is only applil'd
to how.;e:-; and other buildings, but in its original.
pro1wr. and legal sPn:-;e it signifies everything thal
mayb0 holden. prO\ided it be of a permanwnt nature.
whethPr it be of a :-;uhstantial and sensible or of an
unsub:-;tantial. ideal. kind."
The term "hereditaments" is defined in Black':-; La11
Dictionary. Fourth Edition, 19G7, at Page 8G9 as:
"Things capable of being inherited, he it corporeal or
or incorporeal, real. personal, or mixed, and including
not onl~· lands and ever~·thing thereon. but also heirlooms, and certain furniture which, by custom. ma)
descent to the heir together with the land."
In Moore vs. Sharpe, 91 Ark .+07, 1:21 S.W. 3-tl, at Page
344. it was stated:
"The term 'hereditaments' includes anything that ma)
be inherited, be it corporeal or incorporeal. real .
personal. or mixed. The word i::o almo:-;t as comprc>hensive as 'property'."
Black's Law Dictionary. Fourth Edition, 19f57. define'
"appurtenance" at page l:);) Ds follo1\s:

"That which belongs to "omething else; an adjunct; an
appendate; sonwthing annexed to another thing more
worthy as principal, and which passes as incident to
it, as a right of way or other easement to land; an outhouse, barn, garden. or orchard, to a house or messuagc.
(case cited) An article adapted lo the use ofthe property
to which it is connected, and which was intented to be
a permament accession to the freehold."
An article may bocome an "appurtenance" to realty
without physical attachment. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company vs. Jensen, 69 S.D. 225, 9 N.W. 2d 140, 141
The Defendant states that the Sheriff's Deed conveyed
only the real property and no personal property was included
in this transaction. If this were true, the aforementioned
term:-; which were included in the deed are mere surplusage
and meaningless. Almost all real property transactions,
especially those involving private residence, necessarily
inclucle the transfer of ownership of personal property which
is related to th0 use and enjoyment of the fee. It is not unreasonable to conclude that swimming pool equipment is
related

to the use and Pnjoyment of real property which

rnntains a swimming pool even though the equipment is not
actual!~· physically attached to the real property or pool.
Defendant's ownership of the real property ceased on
January 26, 196fi, when the Sheriff's Deed conveyed owner,;hip to D.L. Holt. On August 7, 1965, seven and one-half
months after the ShNiff's Sale. the Defendant vacated the
prPmi:-;es and took with him all of his personal effects. He
ldt lwhind the items I isted in Plaintiff's Complaint and some
of tlw item:-; listPd in his counterclaim. On May 8, 1966, he
11ent to the Plaintiff\; residence and without notice or
de111and tre,.,1rn:-;sNI on th0 property and removed the items

listed in Plaintifl"s Complaint. Thi:-; act took plal'l' 10 month.'
after the Sheriff's Sale and ovt>r

n i n P month:-; after th,,

Defendant had vacated the premise:-;.
In the case of Duckett v;-;. Horne Building and Loan
Association, 10 Pa. D. & C. 2d 181. (19G7) the Plaintiff,
purchased a home and aftpr one year defaulted on the mort
gage payments. The defendant brought !(~gal action and for\··
closed on the property and it was sold at Sheriff's ~air to
the Veterans Administration. The Veterans Administration
notified the owner to vacate the premises whi<'h they did.
leaving on the premises the storm window:-;, c;creens. and
venetian blinds. The Veteran,,; :\drnini:-;tration then sold th\•
the property to another party. Plaintiff brought thi:-; action to
recover the value of these items.
The Court held that the storm windows and screen:-; \1erp
fixtures and as such passed with the rPalty. Ho1H'1er. the)
held in regard to the venetian blinds a:-; follow:-;:
"The venetian blind:-; purcha:-;ed by t.he Plaintiffs ma)
be said to fall within the cla:-;s of l'hattPl:-i. 11hich. in
the case of Clayton vs. Lienhard. C\12 Pa. 4.:33. arP
described as 'those which are manifest!~ furnitun-'. ac
distinguished from improvemonts, and not particular
fitted to the property with which tlw~ are uc;ed.' ThP'I'
chattels are heldtoalwaysrernainpersonalty. Hm1e1er.
where the ownl'fs of chattels 1oluntarily relinqui,;h
control thereof and leave th<>rn on the premi,,;es after
due notice to vacate, knowing that the property ha,;
been sold to another, they must bt> considered to hall'
abandoned these chattel~. See 1 Arn Jur 2d§:3 on Abandonment."

It has been held that mere nonuse of propPrty and

lap~e

of time without claiming ownership is insufficient to proll'
abandonment.

However, such facts are cornpPtent P1idt>nl'l'

6

of an intent to abandon and are entitled to great weight when

1 Am Jur 2d, §41,

considered with the other circumstances.

\bandonment, Pages ;33 & 34. In the case at hand there are
nunwrou:-; circumstances present to show conclusively that
thP Defendant intended to abandon the swimming pool equip-

a:0

11·011

as the other items involved herein.

First, the Defen-

dant had knowledge of the Sheriff':-; Sale in January of 1965
and wal' awar0 that the new owner would request him to move.
Se(·ond. the DPfendant vacated the premises in Augu.'."t of
19();),

and took with him his personal effects and those

chattel:-;
tlw

he d0sired

D0f0ndant

knew

leaving behind all other:-;.
that the

property had

Third,

been resold

to thP Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff had moved rn on

1966. Fourth, the Defendant made no claim to
m1 ner:-;hip of the property until the date he trespassed to
m1101e it.
Fifth, the DPfendant did not make claim to
mrner:-;hip of the propPrty listPd in his counterclaim until
.\ugu:-;t 7, 1966, one month after this action was commenced.
\pril

~5.

The Defendant :-;tates that even if he has abandoned
lh0 pro1wrty the title to said property would not vest in the
Plaintiff.

By the very definition of abandonment, the owner

r0linquishe:-; his right, title, claim, and possession to any
1wr:-;on who reduces it to possession.
11

When the Defendant

alked away from the property and left the swimming pool

Pquipment, work bench, and other items behind. his intention was to 0ither abandon it to the next owner or to make
a :-;ale of the property to
<·e:-;sor in int<>re:-;t.

~Ir.

Holt, the Plaintiff's prede-

The chain of title is without inter-

ruption either wa~·. ThP only other logical conclusion is
that he intended to make a gift of the property to Mr. Holt.
The Defendant's position as to the damages awarded
to 1hP Plaintiff i:-; correct.

Since the value of the property

7

C'onverted by the defendant has not been e:-;taLlished in
record and the value alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint wa,
denied by the Defendant, the Trial Court should have onh
granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to
liability and set the matter for trial on the issue of damage,
As to the Trial Court's award of $1.00 punitive damages, there is ample evidence in the record to show a wilful!
trespass on Plaintiff's property to support an award of ~ucli
a nominal amount. Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 8 atSks the
following question:
"8. Did the Defendant ask and receive permission
from the Plaintiff or his authorized agent to enter
the premises located at 2512 East 4800 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on or about the 8th day of May.
1966?"
(record Page 8)
The

Defendant's

sworn

answer was:

"8. The Defendant went to the door and no one was
at home."
(record page 11)

CONCLUSION
There is ample evidence contained in this record to
support the Trial Court's finding that there was no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the Plaintiff wa;
entitled a Judgment as a matter of law against the Dden
dant on the issue of liability.

The Trial Court'::; award to the Plaintiff of the alleged
\a]ue of the property without proof as to it's value was in
error.

The award of punitive damages of $1.00 for trespass
upon Plaintiff's property is supported by the record.
The Trial Court's ruling on liability should be affirmed
and the matter referred back to the District Court for a
determination as to damages.

Respectfully submitted,
DA YID E. YOCOM
Attorney for Plaintiff & Respondent
KARRAS, VAN SC IVER & YOCOM
661 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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